Radiological assessment in case of an incident at the hot cells clean-up by Dragolici Cristian A. & Zorliu Adrian
RA  DIO  LOG  I  CAL  AS  SESS  MENT  IN  CASE  OF  AN
IN  CI  DENT  AT  THE  HOT  CELLS  CLEAN-UP
by
Cristian A. DRAGOLICI* and Adrian ZORLIU
Na  tional In  sti  tute of R&D for Phys  ics and Nu  clear En  gi  neer  ing “Horia Hulubei”, Magurele, Ro  ma  nia
Tech ni cal  pa per
DOI:  10.2298/NTRP1402157D
The clean-up and de  con  tam  i  na  tion of the hot cells will be per  formed in the sec  ond phase of
the  WWR-S  re search  re ac tor  de com mis sion ing.  Iden ti fi ca tion  of  pos si ble  in ci dents  or  ac ci -
dents is the key el  e  ment in ra  dio  log  i  cal as  sess  ment and pre  ven  tion. As ma  jor in  ci  dent it was
con sid ered a fire burst that oc curred dur ing the prog ress of the clean-up op er a tions. The pos -
tu  lated in  ci  dent has, as a con  se  quence, thick smoke gen  er  a  tion from the burned ra  dio  ac  tive
ma te rial  and  the  dis per sion  of  this  ma te rial  in  the  en vi ron ment  through  the  tech no log i cal
ven  ti  la  tion sys  tem and the evac  u  a  tion chim  ney. From the per  formed anal  y  sis it can be seen
that in the case of an in ci  dent to the re  ac tor hot cells, an op er  a  tor en  gaged in in ter ven tion op  -
er  a  tions could take an ef  fec  tive dose of 5.29 Sv per event, com  ing from both ex  ter  nal and in  -
ter  nal ex  po  sure. Such an in  ci  dent, if it hap  pens, would be clas  si  fied of level 3 on the INES
scale.
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IN TRO DUC TION
The WWR-S re  search re  ac  tor owned by the Na  -
tional In  sti  tute of Re  search & De  vel  op  ment for Phys  -
ics and Nu  clear En  gi  neer  ing “Horia Hulubei”
(IFIN-HH), Magurele, Ro  ma  nia, was com  mis  sioned
in 1957 and it was shut  down in 1997. The fa  cil  ity is a
light-wa ter-cooled-mod er ated-and-re flected,  het er o -
ge  neous, ther  mal re  ac  tor. It is a tank type Rus  sian or  i  -
gin re  search re  ac  tor used mainly for ra  dio  iso  tope pro  -
duc  tion and for ap  plied and fun  da  men  tal re  search
per  formed in the In  sti  tute [1]. In 2002, Ro  ma  nian
Gov  ern  ment de  cided that the WWR-S re  ac  tor will be
per ma nently  shut  down  for  de com mis sion ing  [2].
At the end of 2012, all the Rus  sian or  i  gin fuel
(10% and 36% en rich ment in 235U) was com pletely re -
moved from the site and sent back to the Rus  sian Fed  -
er  a  tion, cre  at  ing a wide work  ing front for the de  com  -
mis sion ing  ac tiv i ties.
The  de com mis sion ing  of  the WWR-S  re ac tor  of
IFIN-HH will be ac  com  plished through a pro  cess in  -
clud  ing three suc  ces  sive stages [3]. This pro  cess cor  -
re  sponds to the method en  ti  tled by In  ter  na  tional
Atomic En ergy Agency (IAEA) as im me di ate dis man -
tling method, af  ter an au  tho  rized pe  riod of pres  er  va  -
tion [4, 5]. Be cause im me di ate dis man tling op er a tions
will be fin ished in sev eral years af ter re ac tor stop ping,
work ers  ex po sure  to  ra di a tion  will  be,  gen er ally,
higher than for meth  ods which use de  ferred dis  man  -
tling and have, as a con  se  quence, de  lay of works.
The clean-up and de  con  tam  i  na  tion of the hot
cells will be per  formed in the sec  ond phase of the
WWR-S re search re ac tor de com mis sion ing, when the
ex ter nal  sys tems  are  dis man tled. 
At the be gin ning of the clean-up and de con tam i -
na tion of the hot cells, the fol low ing sys tems should be 
op er a tional:
– the  me chan i cal  ma nip u la tors,
– the car  riage for trans  por  ta  tion be  tween hot cells,
– the cut  ting ma  chine,
– the elec  tric lift  ing sys  tems for open  ing the ra  dio  -
ac  tive sources stor  age lid and the gates be  tween
the hot cells, and
– the light  ing sys  tem.
De com mis sion ing  ac tiv i ties  of  the  hot  cells  are
sub  jected to com  plex laws and reg  u  la  tions in the nu  -
clear  field.  Thus,  ra dio log i cal  as sess ment  should  be
con ducted  sys tem at i cally  dur ing  the  hot  cells  de com -
mis sion ing  by  im ple ment ing  well-de fined  stages  [6]:
– op ti miz ing the radioprotection by plan ning the de -
com mis sion ing  ac tiv i ties  in  ac cor dance  with  the
cho sen  de com mis sion ing  strat egy,
– iden ti fy ing  the  ra dio log i cal  is sues  that  may  arise
in  the  nor mal  de com mis sion ing  ac tiv i ties  and
their  en gi neer ing  anal y sis,
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that  may  oc cur  dur ing  de com mis sion ing  pro cess
and  their  en gi neer ing  anal y sis,
– eval u a tion of the con se quences of de com mis sion -
ing ac tiv i ties on the per son nel in volved and on the
pop u la tion, both in the nor mal de vel op ment of the
de  com  mis  sion  ing pro  cess and in the case of in  ci  -
dents/ac ci dents,
– comparing the re  sults with the rel  e  vant se  cu  rity
eval u a tion  cri te ria,  and
– establishing mea  sures for pre  ven  tion and mit  i  ga  -
tion of the con  se  quences [7, 8].
The pres ent pa per deals with the ra dio log i cal as -
sess ment of a ma jor in ci dent that could af fect the en vi -
ron  ment, but mostly the staff in  volved in mit  i  ga  tion
ac  tiv  i  ties. In our work the most im  por  tant thing is to
de  fine the ra  dio  ac  tiv ity source, based on the re  mained
long-lived radionuclides from the in  ven  tory. It was
found that the most im  por  tant con  tri  bu  tion to the to  tal
dose is given by 60Co, 137Cs, and 90Sr. Source mod  el  -
ing, ac tiv ity and dose cal cu la tions were per formed us -
ing the MicroShield pro  gram. For math  e  mat  i  cal mod  -
el ing, it was also nec es sary to es tab lish the time (steps) 
re quired for a worker in ter ven tion dur ing the in ci dent.
Ba  si  cally we will pres  ent a pos  si  ble sce  nario for the
hot cell no. 1 (HC1), which has the rich  est ra  dio  ac  tive
in  ven  tory and pres  ents the high  est risk in terms of ra  -
dio  log  i  cal and health safety for the op  er  at  ing per  son  -
nel in  volved in these ac  tiv  i  ties.
HOT CELLS DE  SCRIP  TION
Dur  ing 40 years the hot cells served for pro  duc  -
tion of ra dio iso topes used for re search, med i cal and in -
dus  trial pur  poses. As a raw ex  am  ple we can men  tion
99mTc (1.85×1012 Bq per year), 90Y (7.4×1010 Bq per
year), 99Mo (1.85×1012 Bq per year), 198Au (1.85×1012
Bq per year), 131I (3.7×1012 Bq per year), 192Ir (3.145×
×1014 Bq per year), used in med i cine, 42K (1.48×1011 Bq 
per year), 82Br (7.4×1010 Bq per year), 32P (1.11×1011
Bq per year), 35S (1.11×1010 Bq per year), used in
radiochemistry, and 60Co (1.85×1011 Bq per year) for
in dus trial  ap pli ca tions.  All  these  el e ments  were  ob -
tained by ir  ra  di  a  tion in the re  ac  tor ac  tive core chan  -
nels.  Be fore  ir ra di a tion,  the  ma te ri als  were  care fully
packed  in  cy lin dri cal  alu mi num  con tain ers  hav ing  the
di men sions of Ø 37 mm ´ 140 mm and Ø 22 mm ´ 140
mm.  Af ter  ir ra di a tion,  the  con tain ers  were  low ered  by
a wire into HC1 through a con  nec  tion tube. Here, the
con tain ers were cut with a cut ting ma  chine and the ra -
dio ac tive sources were ex tracted by me chan i cal hands
and shielded in spe cial con tain ers. There fore, hot cells
in ven tory is very rich in ra dio ac tive waste and sources. 
From the known his  tory, we pre  sume that hot cells
con  tain also bot  tles and am  poules with so  lu  tions of
60Co, 134Cs, 133Ba,  63Ni,  and  alu mi num  con tain ers
with fis  sion prod  ucts like 90Sr, 137Cs, and 134Cs used
for ex  per  i  ments. Of course, short-lived el  e  ments are
al  ready van  ished but long-lived nuclides are still a
con  cern. Es  ti  ma  tions have been made in or  der to es  -
tab  lish the quan  tity and the ac  tiv  ity of the hot cells in  -
ven tory [9]. Also, it should be noted that in HC1, ar eas
can be found, which con  tain sig  nif  i  cant quan  ti  ties of
com bus ti ble  sub stances  (pos si bly  con tam i nated):  lu -
bri  cants, sol  vents, plas  tic sheets and rags, wooden
struc tures  (small  scaf fold ing,  sup ports,  etc.), plas  tic
boxes and am  poule hold  ers, wipe pads of gauze and
cot  ton, fil  ter pa  pers, clogged fil  ters and rub  ber hoses.
The lo  ca  tion of the HC1 is il  lus  trated in fig. 1. 
Thus, room no. 21 cor  re  sponds to hot cells no. 5
and 4, and room no. 22-24 cor  re  spond to the hot cells
no. 3, 2, and 1. Fur  ther  more, at the end of cor  ri  dor no.
25 one can find the room no. 18, where the con  trol
panel is lo  cated, which com  mands the hot cells gates
and the car  riage that pro  vide ma  te  rial and equip  ment
move ment to and from the hot cells. On the other side,
on the op po site di rec tion of the op er a tor's rooms, is the 
cor  ri  dor no. 17, which pro  vides the ac  cess to the rear
part of the hot cells through mas  sive lead and steel
doors. At the op  po  site end of the cor  ri  dor no. 17 en  -
trance area, is room no. 19, which al lows the ac cess to
the hot cell no. 5. HC1 has the fol  low  ing di  men  sions:
3.1 m long, 1.8 m wide and 2.6 m high. In the mid dle of 
the HC1, the ra dio ac tive sources stor age can be found,
which is be lieved to ac com mo date most of the high ac -
tive sources pro  duced dur  ing time. The ra  dio  ac  tive
sources stor  age has a cy  lin  dri  cal shape with Ø = 400
mm and is lo  cated at 600 mm be  neath the HC1 floor
level. The stor age has a thick lead lid above which can
be lifted with a me  chan  i  cal sys  tem, to  gether with the
metal rack car ry ing the ra dio ac tive sources. In or der to 
es tab lish  the  ba sis for  re al is tic  es ti ma tion  of the  ra dio -
log  i  cal risk, the op  er  a  tor staff made di  rect mea  sure  -
ments of the equiv  a  lent dose and equiv  a  lent dose rate
in  side HC1. To mea  sure the equiv  a  lent dose re  ceived
by a worker who is par tic i pat ing at the clean ing op er a -
tion of HC1, an in  di  vid  ual do  sim  e  ter with di  rect read  -
ing, sim  i  lar to those worn by op  er  at  ing per  son  nel en  -
gaged in these ac tiv i ties, was in tro duced in side the hot
cell. The in  tro  duced do  sim  e  ter is of Saphydose type
and can mea  sure an equiv  a  lent dose of gamma ra  di  a  -
tion in the range of 1 mSv-10 Sv. The do sim e ter was in -
tro  duced in HC1 through the trans  port car  riage serv  -
ing the trans  por  ta  tion be  tween the hot cells (fig. 2).
The mea  sure  ment point was lo  cated at the en  trance of
HC1, at about 1 m away from the cen  ter, and the mea  -
sure  ment time was 5 min  utes. Dur  ing the mea  sure  -
ments, the metal rack with ra  dio  ac  tive sources was
low  ered in the down po  si  tion in the stor  age. Af  ter the
mea  sure  ment, the de  vice was re  moved from the HC1,
in the same way as it was in  tro  duced. The equiv  a  lent
dose re  corded by the de  vice dur  ing 5 min  utes was
19.897 mSv.
The equiv  a  lent dose rates, mea  sured by the
health phys  ics di  vi  sion op  er  a  tors within the HC1 are
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ing a Thermo FH 40 GX type do sim e ter with a 612-10
FHZ at  tached probe that can re  cord dose rate val  ues
be tween 0.1 mSv/h-10 Sv/h. Be  cause the es  ti mates for
this type of mea sure ments had fore seen very high dose 
rates, for the op er at ing per son nel safety and for the ac -
cu  racy of the re  sults it was de  cided to lower the mea  -
sur ing probe from re ac tor lids through the dry chan nel
43/4, in  side the HC1 (fig. 3). For this pur  pose, be  -
tween the do sim e ter and the probe a spe cial mea sur ing
ca  ble 20 m long, was in  ter  posed.
To pre vent sep a ra tion of the probe from the con -
nec tion jack and dam age of the mea sur ing ca ble, a “re -
in  force  ment” steel ca  ble of Ø = 4 mm tied in par  al  lel
with it was used. The de  tec  tor along with the con  nec  -
tions, has been shrink wrapped and a lead weight tied
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Fig  ure 1. Lo  ca  tion of HC1
Fig ure  2.  In tro duc tion  of  a  do sim e ter  in  HC1to  the  same  steel ca  ble, was at  tached at a dis  tance of
40 cm from the probe bot  tom.
In the HC1, the mea  sure  ments were made han  -
dling the probe by means of me chan i cal ma nip u la tors.
The probe was taken from the in  let to the HC1 by one
of the ma  nip  u  la  tors and was ran  domly “walked” over
ma  te  ri  als and ob  jects in or  der to de  tect hot spots with
high ac tiv ity. The de tected hot spots were re corded in a 
log book by an op  er  a  tor.
DE SCRIP TION  OF  SITE
SUR ROUND ING  AREA
The WWR-S re ac tor is lo cated in Magurele City, 
8 km away in a straight line from the Bu cha rest down -
town. Magurele City com  prises 11,041  of  in hab it ants
spread over a to  tal sur  face of 45 km2, about 245 res  i  -
dents per square ki  lo  me  ter. The re  ac  tor site is sur  -
rounded by a round for  est 1.6 km in di  am  e  ter. At the
end of the for  est, the first group of houses of the
Magurele City in  hab  it  ants can be found on a plane
field. We can es ti mate that the crit i cal group of pop u la -
tion could be found be  tween 800 and 1000 m away
from the re  ac  tor lo  ca  tion, around the cir  cu  lar for  est.
This area ac  com  mo  dates about 47 houses where ap  -
prox i mately  277  peo ple  live.
SCE NARIO  PRE SEN TA TION
Anal  y  sis of the in  ci  dent men  tioned in the ti  tle is
based on the in  for  ma  tion from the ref  er  ence [6]. The
event en  ti  tled “Fire in the fa  cil  ity due to the dam  aged
elec  tri  cal sys  tem” is pos si  ble to oc cur be  cause the ini -
tial  elec tri cal  in stal la tion  of  the  WWR-S  re ac tor  will
also be used dur ing the de com mis sion ing pro cess. Ca -
ble in  su  la  tion may be dam  aged, so the oc  cur  rence of
ig  ni  tion sources is not to  tally ex  cluded. It is as  sumed
that the fire broke out in the HC1.
Clean  ing and de  con  tam  i  na  tion of hot cells is a
hard work which pres ents ra dio log i cal risks for the op -
er at ing per son nel. This work should be done in the fol -
low ing se quence: re moval of the ra dio ac tive ma te ri als
and  de con tam i na tion  of  hot  cells.
As the first step in clean ing the hot cells we have
to con  sider evac u a tion of those ob jects that show high
ac tiv ity  and  may  con tain  ra dio ac tive  sources.
It is as  sumed that dur  ing the clean  ing pro  cess of
the HC1, it will be nec  es  sary to lift the lid from the ra -
dio ac tive  sources  stor age  to  fa cil i tate  the  emp ty ing  of
the metal rack draw  ers. The rack for the sources stor  -
age has a cy  lin  dri  cal shape and con  tains 3 com  part  -
ments (draw  ers) for stor  age. When the rack is com  -
pletely lifted from the stor  age, the op  er  a  tor ac  ti  vates
the mov  ing sys  tem of the cut  ting ma  chine to move it
away from the area and to fa  cil  i  tate the ac  cess of the
ma nip u la tors  in  tak ing  the  alu mi num  con tain ers  with
the  ra dio ac tive  sources.
Due to the fric  tion be  tween the ca  ble in  su  la  tion
of the mo  tor power sup  ply (which moves the cut  ting
ma  chine) and the sharp edges of alu  mi  num scraps
scat  tered around the hot cell, an elec  tri  cal spark may
oc  cur if the ca  ble in  su  la  tion is dam  aged. In that case,
fire breaks out and will be ex tended to the whole ca ble
in  su  la  tion and be  yond. It is as  sumed that the fire may
be ex  tended to the area of com  bus  ti  ble ma  te  ri  als. We
sup pose  that  the fire will burn over an area of 2.7 m ×
´ 1.5 m = 4.05 m2 with a high flame re leas ing a sig nif i -
cant amount of heat at a high tem  per  a  ture that will ig  -
nite the air fil  ter lo  cated at the top of the hot cell. As a
func  tion of the burn  ing time, the max  i  mum tem  per  a  -
ture of the fire was es tab  lished through the “time-tem -
per a ture” curve de scribed in ISO-834 from ref er ences
[10] and [11]. The max i mum cal cu lated tem per a ture to 
be reached by the fire is 548 °C.
Spread  ing of the fire to the sur  round  ing ar  eas is
un  likely, but not im  pos  si  ble. The fire could spread to
the hot cell no. 2 through the chan  nel of the trans  port
car  riage and could af  fect the room 24 and the cor  ri  dor
25 by emis sion of smoke with ra dio ac tive par ti cles be -
sides  ma nip u la tors  seals.
It is as  sumed that af  ter the fire out  break the air
fil  ter sit  u  ated on the top of the HC1 is set on fire and
de  stroyed. In  side the HC1 the fire gen  er  ates smoke
and ash into the air which causes spread ing of ra dio ac -
tive par ti cles from the burned ma te ri als. In the ab sence 
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Ta ble 1. Mea sure ments of the equiv a lent dose rate in HC1
No. Measurement point in HC1 From To
1 Con  nect  ing pipe en  try in HC1 20 cm left
488 mSv/h
20 cm right
760 mSv/h
2 Sources stor  age area Left
810 mSv/h
Right
1.9 Sv/h
3 Me  tal  lic rack with sources First drawer
1.98 Sv/h
Around it
4.40 Sv/h
4 Me  tal  lic rack with sources Sec ond  drawer
4.50 Sv/h
Around it
4.80 Sv/h
5 Me  tal  lic rack with sources Third drawer
5.01 Sv/h
Around it
6.32 Sv/h
Fig  ure 3. Low  er  ing the 612-10 FHZ probe into the HC1
through the chan  nel 43/4of fil  ter re  ten  tion, they are fully ab  sorbed by the tech  -
no log i cal  ven ti la tion  sys tem  and  dis charged  into  the
en vi ron ment  through  the  ven ti la tion  chim ney  which
has a height of 40 m and a di  am  e  ter of 2 m.
To min i mize the fire ef fects and to pre vent its ex -
ten  sion, fire emer  gency sup  pres  sion mea  sures have to
be taken. These mea sures con sist of re mov ing of those
parts from the com  bus  ti  ble ma  te  ri  als that have not yet
been con  sumed by the flames and ex  tin  guish  ing the
fire with ap  pro  pri  ate fire extinguishers. The only way
to ex tin guish the fire quickly and ef fec tively is send ing 
a  team  of  three  op er a tors  (two  me chan ics  op er a tors
and one health phys  ics op  er  a  tor) to act in cor  ri  dor no.
17 by open  ing the mas  sive lead and steel door that
blocks the ac  cess to the HC1.
Wear ing  ap pro pri ate  pro tec tive  suits  and  re spi ra -
tory masks for the whole face with par  ti  cle pair fil  ters,
equipped with hooks and por  ta  ble fire extinguishers
and un der strict su per vi sion of the health phys ics op er a -
tor,  the  two  me chan i cal  op er a tors  will  cau tiously  ap -
proach the af  fected area try  ing to take the best pos  si  ble
vis  i  bil  ity through the thick cloud of smoke.
Tak  ing into ac  count the mea  sure  ment of the
equiv  a  lent dose de  scribed above, it is con  sid  ered that
in the place where op  er  a  tors will act, the equiv  a  lent
dose re  ceived for a 20 min  ute of in  ter  ven  tion will not
ex  ceed 80 mSv. The health phys  ics op  er  a  tor will con  -
tin u ously  mon i tor  the  do sim e ter  (Thermo  FH  40  TG)
with the tele scopic probe ex tended to max i mum (4 m),
warn ing the two op er a tors when time has ex pired. The
per  son  nel of the team have been trained not to ex  ceed
the es tab lished max i mum ad mis si ble dose of 100 mSv
for the in ter ven tion. When the ar mored door of HC1 is
opened  for  op er a tor  in ter ven tion,  it  cre ates  a  sud den
de  pres  sion in the HC1 ac  cess pas  sage, which forces
the thick smoke to com  pletely oc  cupy the en  tire vol  -
ume of the pas  sage and come out into the cor  ri  dor no.
17. This dis  per  sion of ra  dio  ac  tive smoke from HC1 to
ac cess  cor ri dor  and,  re spec tively,  to  cor ri dor  no.  17,
pro  duces a de  crease by about 102 times of the ini  tial
iso  tope ac  tiv  ity con  tained in the cloud. In ad  di  tion to
sud  den re  duc  ing vis  i  bil  ity, thick smoke and high tem  -
per  a  ture soon lead to fil  ter clog  ging of the op  er  a  tors
masks. Their ef  fec  tive  ness drops sharply to 55%.
Try  ing to re  move from the fire some alu  mi  num
con tain ers which are sup posed to have great ac tiv i ties,
the op  er  a  tors wrong han  dled the hook and over  turned
the rack with the ra  dio  ac  tive sources. The sources are
kept  in  cy lin dri cal  con tain ers  made  of  alu mi num,
which can roll eas  ily and spread ev  ery  where, in  clud  -
ing in the ac cess pas sage of the HC1 at the foot level of
the  three  op er a tors.
The thick smoke from HC1 pre vented the op er a -
tors to ob serve the roll ing con tain ers com ing in side the 
ac  cess pas  sage. This ac  ci  dent can hap  pen sud  denly
with out any prior warn ing, ex pos ing the 3 op er a tors to
an equiv  a  lent dose rate of 6.32 Sv/h.
Due to the small di  men  sions (0.9 m ´ 0.4 m) of
the ac  cess pas  sage, and to the low ox  y  gen con  cen  tra  -
tion (be  low 17%) that causes diz  zi  ness, the two
me chan i cal  op er a tors  lose  their  bal ance,  slip  on  the
alu  mi  num con  tain  ers and fall down in the cor  ri  dor no.
17.  Fol low ing  this  ac ci dent  the  op er a tor's  frac tures
one of their up per limbs, the shock and the lack of ox y -
gen re  sult  ing in loss of con  scious  ness.
This ac ci dent may re sult in ex ceed ing the time of 
20 min  utes pro  vided for in  ter  ven  tion in the af  fected
area. In this case, for the re cov ery of in jured op er a tors
it must be sent a sec  ond emer  gency team con  sist  ing of
5 peo  ple (4 me  chan  ics op  er  a  tors and one health phys  -
ics  op er a tor).  De pend ing  on  the  sit u a tion  and  the  time
spent in the field of ra  di  a tion, the doses un  der  taken by
the op  er  at  ing per  son  nel can be even fa  tal.
EX PO SURE  ASSESSMENT
We as  sume that all ma  te  ri  als and ob  jects in HC1
are  con  tam  i  nated  with  the fol  low  ing iso  topes:  60Co
(1 TBq), 137Cs (2 TBq), and 90Sr (0.5 TBq). There fore,
the smoke will con  tain these ra  dio  ac  tive iso  topes, but
it is sup  posed that due to the promptly in  ter  ven  tion of
the op  er  a  tors only 15% of their ini  tial ac  tiv  ity will be
dis charged  into  the  en vi ron ment.  The  re main ing  85%
will re main in HC1 in the form of smoke with con tam i -
nated  air borne  par ti cles.
To cal  cu  late doses and as  sess the im  pact to the
pop  u  la  tion, we use the model an  a  lyzed in ref  er  ence
[6]. Ra di a tion doses for the pop u la tion were cal cu lated 
us ing the meth od ol ogy and the co ef fi cients from  [12].
The main ex  po  sure path  ways for the pop  u  la  tion, con  -
sid  ered for this sce  nario are:
– ex ter nal  ex po sure  to  air borne  ma te rial,
– ex ter nal ex po sure of the ma te rial de pos ited on the
ground for 24 hours, and
– in ter nal  ex po sure  due  to  in ges tion  of  air borne  ra -
dio ac tive  ma te rial.
Dose equiv  a  lents were cal  cu  lated for whole
body (the ef  fec  tive dose). The cal  cu  la  tion method has
been pre sented in [13]. Fac tors re leased into the at mo -
sphere were cal  cu  lated us  ing the method from [14].
Taken into con  sid  er  ation the data pre  sented in tab. 2
we can cal  cu  late the col  lec  tive dose for the crit  i  cal
group of pop u la tion of 2.97×10–7 Sv. Due to the tech ni -
cal and ad min is tra tive mea sures, the im pact to the peo -
ple and en  vi  ron  ment is strongly re  duced. Be  cause the
in ci dent  in flu ence  on  the  pub lic  and  en vi ron ment  is
neg  li  gi  ble, we will pres  ent just the re  sults which are
listed be  low in tab. 2 and fig. 2. Fur  ther, we will fo  cus
only on the im  pact on the op  er  at  ing per  son  nel in  -
volved  in  in ter ven tion  for  mit i ga tion  pur poses.
We as sume that 85% of the ra dio ac tive in ven tory 
con tained by the smoke is still in HC1 at the mo ment of 
op er a tor's  in ter ven tion,  the  re main ing  15%  be ing  dis -
charged through the re ac tor ven ti la tion chim ney. Con -
sid  er  ing that 15% of the out  side dis  charged ra  dio  ac  -
tive in  ven  tory is com  ing from the ini  tial ac  tiv  ity of
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of re  main  ing iso  topes in HC1 are of the or  der 0.85
TBq (60Co), 1.7 TBq (137Cs), and 0.425 TBq (90Sr).
The to  tal dose taken by an op  er  a  tor con  sid  er  ing
the  ex po sure  by  di rect  ra di a tion  and  by  in ha la tion  is
given by the fol  low  ing for  mula [15]
D D D D h g J
j
tot ext inh ext j,inh j,inh = + = +å ( )
where Dtot [Sv] is the to  tal dose taken by the op  er  a  tor,
Dext [Sv] – the dose due to ex ter nal ex po sure to gamma
ra di a tion,  Dinh [Sv] – the dose due to in  ha  la  tion of the
smoke  with  con tam i nated  air borne  par ti cles,  h(g)j,inh
[Sv/Bq] – the com  mit  ted ef  fec  tive dose per unit of in  -
cor po ra tion through in ha la tion of a radionuclide j, and
Jj,inh [Bq] – the in cor po ra tion through in ha la tion of the
radionuclide j.
Tak  ing into ac  count that:
– the vol  ume of the HC1 is 3.1 m ´ 1.8 m ´ 2.6 m =
=.14.51 m
3,
– the vol  ume of the HC1 ac  cess pas  sage is 0.9 m ´
´.0.4 m ´ 1.6 m = 0.58 m
3,
– the to tal vol ume of the HC1+ the ac cess pas sage is
14.51 m
3 + 0.58 m
3 = 15.09 m
3,
– the breath  ing rate for a worker is 1.2 m
3/h [16],
– the  in ter ven tion  time  (and  for  in ha la tion  of
radionuclides) is 20 minutes = 0.33 h,
– the ac  tiv  ity of  
60Co = 0.85E+10 Bq,
– the  ac tiv ity  of 
137Cs = 1.70E+10 Bq, and
– the ac  tiv  ity of  
90Sr = 0.43E+10 Bq.
we can cal cu late the radionuclide con cen tra tion in side
HC1:
– the  con cen tra tion  of   
60Co = 5.6E+08 Bq/m
3,
– the con cen tra tion of 
137Cs = 11.3E+08 Bq/m
3, and
– the  con cen tra tion  of 
90Sr = 2.9E+08 Bq/m
3.
We also con  sider the val  ues in tab. 3 [15].
Due to the de crease of the pro tec tive mask fil ters
ef fi ciency,  in  20  min utes  of  in ter ven tion  an  op er a tor
in  hales 0.4 m3 of con  tam  i  nated air with up to 45% of
the  ra dio ac tive  iso topes  ac tiv ity  re main ing  in  HC1.
This means that dur  ing the in  ter  ven  tion at HC1
an op  er  a  tor  will  in  take  1.01E+08  Bq of  60Co,
2.03E+08 Bq of 137Cs, and 0.52E+08 Bq of 90Sr.
With the above con  sid  ered equa  tion we can cal  -
cu late the to tal dose for the in ter nal and ex ter nal ex po -
sure of a sin  gle op  er  a  tor
Dtot = 2.10 Sv + (0.97 Sv + 0.97 Sv + 1.25 Sv) = 5.29 Sv
We can note that in case of an in  ci  dent in the hot
cells, an op  er  a  tor en  gaged in in  ter  ven  tion may take a
dose of 5.29 Sv com  ing from ex  ter  nal and in  ter  nal ex  -
po sure.
The anal  y  sis per  formed on the sce  nario pre  -
sented, in  di  cate that the in  take dose by an op  er  a  tor
may ex  ceed 5 Sv per event.
MEA  SURES TO BE TAKEN
The  ul ti mate  ob jec tive  an a lyz ing  the  pre sented
sce nario  is  to  iden tify  ap pro pri ate  pre ven tive,  pro tec -
tive and mit  i  ga  tion mea  sures, so the sce  nario does not
hap  pen and if it hap  pens, the con  se  quences are much
lesser than cal  cu  lated here.
Clean-up is the con  ven  tional and most fre  quent
op er a tion  en coun tered  to  this  type  of  in stal la tion  and
phase  of  ac tiv i ties,  nev er the less,  un ex pected  events
can oc  cur de  spite all mea  sures taken. There  fore, step
by step as  sess  ment is needed to eval  u  ate the risks and
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Ta  ble 2. The ef  fec  tive dose for the pop  u  la  tion
Dis tance
[m]
Ex po sure  to
the
ra dio ac tive
cloud  [Sv]
In ges tion
[Sv]
Ex po sure  to  the
ra dio ac tive
ma te ri als
de pos ited  on
soil [Sv]
To tal
ef fec tive
dose [Sv]
200 9.54E-61
* 6.38E-58 4.57E-59 6.84E-58
300 3.14E-37 2.10E-34 1.51E-35 2.25E-34
500 1.20E-21 7.99E-19 5.72E-20 8.58E-19
700 4.09E-16 2.73E-13 1.95E-14 2.93E-13
1000 1.50E-12 1.00E-09 7.16E-11 1.08E-09
2000 2.94E-09 1.96E-06 1.39E-07 2.11E-06
3000 1.79E-08 1.20E-05 8.45E-07 1.28E-05
4000 3.55E-08 2.37E-05 1.66E-06 2.54E-05
5000 4.84E-08 3.23E-05 2.25E-06 3.46E-05
6000 5.61E-08 3.75E-05 2.60E-06 4.02E-05
7000 6.02E-08 4.02E-05 2.77E-06 4.31E-05
8000 6.20E-08 4.14E-05 2.83E-06 4.43E-05
9000 6.22E-08 4.16E-05 2.83E-06 4.45E-05
10000 6.16E-08 4.12E-05 2.78E-06 4.40E-05
15000 5.44E-08 3.63E-05 2.38E-06 3.88E-05
20000 4.70E-08 3.14E-05 1.99E-06 3.35E-05
* 9.54E-61 read as 9.54×10
–61
Fig  ure 4. The ef  fec  tive dose for the population
Ta  ble 3. Work  ers com  mit  ted ef  fec  tive dose per unit
in take  via  in ha la tion
Iso tope T1/2 Type
In ha la tion
f1
h (g)
1 µm 5 µm
Co-60 5.27 years M 0.1 9.60E-09 7.10E-09
Cs-137 30.00 years F 1.000 4.80E-09 6.70E-09
Sr-90 29.10 years F 0.3 2.40E-08 3.00E-08es tab lish  ap pro pri ate  mit i ga tion  mea sures.  The  first
mea sure  taken  should  be  re con sid er ing  and  re vis ing
the work  ing pro  ce  dures, so that no mis  takes are al  -
lowed in sources ma nip u la tion and firefighting. Better
train ing of the op er a tors with em pha sis on firefighting
tech  nique and pro  ce  dures, should be also con  sid  ered.
Im prove ment  of  the  pro tec tive  suits  by  ac qui si tion  of
alu  mi  nized flame proof and heat pro  tec  tion gar  ment
with in de pend ent breath ing ap pa ra tus un der the suit, is 
com  pul  sory to face such events. Nev  er  the  less, an im  -
por tant at ten tion should be paid to care ful ex am i na tion 
and anal y sis of the best tech nique and pro ce dures to be 
used  for  con se quence  mit i ga tion. 
CON CLU SIONS
The sce  nario con  sid  ered above is the worst sit  u  a  -
tion that could ap  pear dur  ing the clean-up of the hot
cells. It was se lected on pur pose to be con  ser  va  tive and
due to the pris  tine con  di  tion of the hot cells this event
has a sig  nif  i  cant prob  a  bil  ity to oc  cur. It is based on a
very close to re  al  ity HC1 in  ven  tory and on ex  ist  ing
equip  ment and ma  te  ri  als used reg  u  larly and in emer  -
gency cases by the re  ac  tor per  son  nel. The con  cep  tual
model in  cludes the most likely po  ten  tial trans  fer path  -
ways of radionuclides from the source (hot cell in  ven  -
tory) to hu mans. In the con sid ered event the main ex po -
sure path  ways for in  ter  ven  tion staff are di  rect ex  po  sure
to gamma ra di a tion from ra dio ac tive sources and the in -
ha la tion  of  con tam i nated  air,  as sum ing  that  a  cer tain
per  cent age of the to  tal con  tam i  na  tion spread rises in air
as con  tam  i  nated dust and ashes. Slow pro  cesses like
pos si ble  der mal  con tact  with  con tam i nated  sub stances
and  air borne  par ti cles  dur ing  in ter ven tion  were  not
taken  into  con sid er ation.  An a lyz ing  the  con se quences
of the event it can be seen that the dose to the pop u la tion
is neg li gi ble while the im pact to the in ter ven tion op er a -
tors is at high  est risk. Eval  u  at  ing the event, in terms of
ra dio log i cal  safety,  is  its  clas si fi ca tion  on  the  INES
scale [17]. Even though this in  ci  dent did not re  sult in a
sig nif i cant  ex ter nal  re lease  of  ra dio ac tiv ity,  nor  of  im -
por  tant deg  ra  da  tion of in depth de  fense, the event is
clas  si  fied as Level 3 (se  ri  ous in  ci  dent), based on its
high est  risk  for  the  in ter ven tion  op er a tors.  Ex po sure
rates of more than 1 Sv/h in an op er at ing area and se vere 
con tam i na tion in an area not ex pected by de sign, with a
low  prob a bil ity  of  sig nif i cant  pub lic  ex po sure,  jus tify
the se lected level. From this sur vey we can ob serve that
even  fa cil i ties like no fuel re ac tors or re ac tors be ing de -
com  mis  sioned, whether or not the fuel is still on-site,
can raise se  ri  ous prob  lems dur  ing per  form  ing so called
nor mal  ac tiv i ties.
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Kristijan A. DRAGOLICI, Adrijan ZORLIU
RADIOLO[KA  PROCENA  U  SLU^AJU  INCIDENTA
TOKOM  ^I[]EWA  VRU]IH  ]ELIJA
^i{}ewe i dekontaminacija vru}ih }elija bi}e obavqeni tokom druge faze dekomisije
istra`iva~kog reaktora WWR-S. Identifikacija mogu}ih incidenata ili akcidenata je kqu~ni
el  e  ment radiolo{ke procene i prevencije. Ve}im incidentom smatra se izbijawe po`ara tokom
operacija ~i{}ewa. Pretpostavqeni in  ci  dent ima za posledicu nastajawe gustog dima od
sagorelog radioaktivnog materijala i rasipawa ovog materijala u okolnu sredinu kroz
ventilacioni sistem i dimwak. Na osnovu ura|enih analiza, vidi se da bi u slu~aju incidenta na
reaktorskim }elijama, tehni~ar ukqu~en u intervenciju mogao da primi efektivnu dozu od 5.29 Sv
po doga|aju, koja poti~e i od spoqa{weg i od unutra{weg izlagawa. Ovakav in  ci  dent bio bi
klasifikovan kao in  ci  dent tre}eg nivoa na INES-ovoj skali.
Kqu~ne re~i: vru}a }elija, radijaciona za{tita, procena doze, sce  nario incidenta,
                          izbijawe po`ara